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NICE INFINITARY LOGICS
SAHARON SHELAH
Abstract. We deal with soft model theory of infinitary logics. We find a
logic between L∞,ℵ0 and L∞,∞ which has some striking properties. First, it
has interpolations (it was known that each of those logics fail interpolation
though the pair has). Second, well ordering is not characterized in a strong
way. Third, it can be characterized as the maximal such nice logic (in fact, is
the maximal logic stronger than L∞,ℵ0 and which satisfies “well ordering is
not characterized in a strong way”).
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2 SAHARON SHELAH
§ 0. Introduction for non-logicians
The first part of the introduction urged to try to explain the aim to general
mathematical audience, so may be skipped by a knowledgeable reader; naturally
we should start by explaining what is first order logic and a general (abstract) logic
from model theoretic perspective.
We may consider classes of rings, and classes of groups but usually we do not
consider a class containing structures of both kinds. Formally a ring is a structure
(or model) M consistent of its universe, set of elements called |M | (but we may
write a ∈M) and interpretations +M ,×M and 0M of the binary function symbols
+,× and the individual consistent symbol (= zero place function symbol) 0. We
also write nM for {(a0, . . . , an−1) : a0, . . . , an−1 an element of M}.
Generally we have a so-called vocabulary τ consisting of relation symbols (=
predicates) and function symbol, each with a given a number of places (= arity).
For a ring M we many times consider the set of n-tuples satisfying some equa-
tions. Model theorist usually look at a wider class of such sets, which start with
the family {{a¯ ∈ nM : a¯ satisfies an equation ϕ} : n ∈ N and ϕ an equation} and
close it under intersection of two (with the same n) compliment inside the relevant
n(M) and projection (from n+1M to nM). So a first order formula for the vocabu-
lary τ, ϕ = ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is a scheme giving for a τ -structure M a subset ϕ(M)
of nM as above. If n = 0, ϕ(M) ∈ {{〈〉}, ∅} then we call ϕ a sentence and say
M satisfifes it, M |= ϕ iff ϕ(M) 6= ∅; let L(τ) be the set of first order sentences
or formulas in the vocabulary τ ; as we can add additional individual constants
the difference is minor. We may consider sets definable with parameters by, i.e.
ϕ(M, b¯) = {a¯ :M |= ϕ[a¯, b¯]}.
There is much to be said for first order logic; e.g. for this family of subsets of
nM for n ∈ N has better closure properties than the set “solutions of finitely many
equations”, i.e. varieties; however we shall not say it here. But in first order logic
we cannot express, e.g. “a group G is locally finite, i.e. every finitely generated
subgroup is finite”. To express this we may allow: if ϕk(x0, . . . , xn−1) is a formulas
for k ∈ N then so is ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) =
∧
k
ϕk(x0, . . . , xk), i.e. ϕ(M) = ∩{ϕk(M) :
k}.
Allowing this we get the logic Lℵ1,ℵ0 , more generally
⊞0 the logic Lλ,κ is defined similarly but the formulas have the form ϕ = ϕ(〈xi :
i < γ〉), γ < κ and we allow
∧
α<β
ϕα(x¯) for β < λ and (∃x0, . . . , xα, . . .)ϕ(x¯, y¯)
where we allow a formula to have < κ free variables, i.e. we consider subsets
of αM for α < κ.
Another strengthening of first order logic is allowing ψ(y¯) = (∃≥ℵ1xϕ(x, y¯), i.e.
ψ(M¯) = {b¯: for uncountably many a ∈ M we have M |= ϕ[b, a¯]}. There are many
other logics.
Now first order logic has many good properties, including (recall, the cardinality
of a set A is the number of elements, which may be infinite, the cardinality of a
model is the number of its element, i.e. the cardinality of its universe ‖M‖)
⊞1 the downward LST (Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski) property:
(a) if a sentence ψ ∈ L(τ) has a model, i.e. M |= ψ then it has a countable
model
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(b) if τ is a vocabulary,M is a τ -model, A ⊆ |M |, |A|+|τ |+ℵ0 ≤ λ < ‖M‖
then there is a τ -model N of cardinality λ, a sub-model of M such
that A ⊆ |N | and ThL(N) = ThL(M) where
• ThL(M) = {ψ ∈ L(τM ) : ψ a sentence M |= ψ}.
This means that first order logic does not distinguish infinite cardinals.
⊞2 compactness: if T is a set of sentences in L(τ) and every finite T
′ ⊆ T has
a model, i.e. for some τ -model M we have ϕ ∈ T ′ ⇒M |= ϕ then T has a
model.
The desirability of this should be obvious.
⊞3 interpolation: if τ0 = τ1 ∩ τ2 are vocabularies, ψ1 ∈ L(τ1), ψ2 ∈ L(τ2)
and ψ1 ⊢ ψ2, i.e. there is no model of ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2, (equivalently if M is a
(τ1 ∪ τ2)-model and M |= ψ1 then M |= ψ), then there is ϕ ∈ L(τ0) such
that ψ1 ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ ϕ2.
First order logic satisfies interpolation: this is Craig theorem. Lindstro¨m set out
to show that first order logic is the natural choice, recalling there are many logics;
for this he has first to define a logic, essentially (see more in Definition 1.9)
⊞4 a logic L consists of the following
(a) a set of sentences L (τ) for any vocabulary τ , we can define formulas
ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) by adding to τ individual constants
(b) satisfaction relation |=L , i.e. M |=L ψ whereM a model, ψ ∈ L (τM )
(c) natural properties like preservation under isomorphisms and mono-
tonicity (i.e. τ1 ⊆ τ2 ⇒ L (τ1) ⊆ L (τ2)).
This seems too wide so (see more in Definition 1.12).
⊞5 L is a nice logic if the sets of sentences L (τ) has some natural closure
properties like:
• if ψ1, ψ2 ∈ L (τ) then for some ψ ∈ L (τ) we have:
M |= ψ iff M |= ψ1 and M |= ψ2.
There is a natural order on the class of logics:
⊞6 L1 ≤ L2 iff for every vocabulary τ and ψ2 ∈ L1(τ) there is ψ2 ∈ L2(τ)
such that: if M is a τ -model then M |=L1 ψ1 iff M |=L2 ψ2
⊞7 L1,L2 are equivalent if L1 ≤ L2 and L2 ≤ L1.
Now we can phrase (really just one of the versions1 of)
⊠ (Lindstro¨m theorem) The logic L is equivalent to L, first order logic when
(a) L is a nice logic
(b) L satisfies LST to ℵ0: i.e. ⊞1(a)
(c) L satisfies compactness, see ⊞2
1e.g. compactness just for countable theorems but then we have to add the occurance number
is ℵ0 or just ℵ0, see Definition 1.11.
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This indicates that the family of nice logics not equivalent to L is the union of:
• the infinitary ones, usually above Lℵ1,ℵ0
• the somewhat compact, usually ℵ0-compact ones.
We here deal with the first.
Lindstro¨m theorem founded “abstract model theory” where we have variables
over logics. In the seventies and eighties this area flourished but a reason for its
almost dying out is the lack of similar theorems for other logics, i.e. discovering (or
pointing out) “interesting” logic which can be characterized in a reasonable way.
The aim of this work is to present such an infinitary logic and prove that it has
some desirable properties. In particular it satifies interpolation which holds only
in “few” cases. This solves some more specific old problems and we hope it will
reopen the case of “abstract model theory”.
In more details, consider the logic is L1κ for any suitable cardinal κ playing the
role of ℵ0 in first order logic
⊞ L1κ satisfies
(a) a downward LST; any sentence which has a model, has one of cardi-
nality < κ
(b) if the vocabulary has cardinality < κ then the number of sentences is
κ
(c) a weak substitute of compactness: well ordering is not definable;
(d) the L1κ-theory of a product of two τ -models M1 ×M2 depend just on
the L1κ-theories of M1 and M2
(e) interpolation, see ⊞3.
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§ 1. Introduction and preliminaries
§ 1(A). Aims.
We feel that this is an important one among my work and will attract little
attention. Is this an oxymoron? We do not think so. See below.
The investigation of model theoretic logics and soft model theory has started
with Lindstro¨m theorems and it was a central topic of model theory in the seven-
ties. Major aims were to find characterization theorems, new important logics and
non-trivial implications. The achievements were to a large extent summed up in
the handbook Barwise-Feferman [Be85] but then the subject become quite muted.
There were some external reasons: stability theory and theoretical computer sci-
ence draw people away and there were also some incidental personal reasons. But
probably the profound reason was a disappointment. The impression was that there
were just too many examples and counterexamples but not enough deep results and,
particularly, too many logics and too few characterization theorems (saying a logic
L is the unique logic such that ...). Recall that Lindstro¨m characterize first order
logic; e.g. as the only “reasonable” logic satisfying compactness (for ℵ0 sentences)
and the downward LST theorem (for one sentence, to ℵ0), (but see §(1D) below).
Still there was some activity later, particularly of Va¨a¨na¨nen.
Here we try to reopen the case. A property which remains mysterious was inter-
polation, see Makowsky [Mak85] in the handbook. It was known that Lℵ1,ℵ0 has in-
terpolation, (Lopez-Escobar) but not Lλ,κ when (λ, κ) 6= (ℵ0,ℵ0), (ℵ1,ℵ0),(Malitz).
On Lκ,θ see Dickman [Dic85]. However, the pair (L<∞,ω,L∞,∞) and even (Lλ+,ω,L(2λ)+,λ+)
has interpolation, a puzzling result. This leads naturally to a question: does this
interpolation come from the existence of an intermediate logic which has interpola-
tion? See more on the history of those questions and on interpolation and related
subjects, [Mak85];
Let us recall some old questions on which we do not advance here. Feferman
raises the question
Question 1.1. Is there an ℵ0-compact logic strenghtening L(∃≥ℵ1) with interpo-
lation.
Note the plethora of extensions of L(∃≥ℵ1). For my taste preferably
Question 1.2. 1) Is there a λ-compact logic stronger than first order satisfying
interpolation, for any λ?
2) Moreover, fully compact one?
Of course, part (2) becomes a question only after fully compact logics > L were
discovered ([Sh:18]).
The introduction of [Be85] mentions the (then latest advance): some compact
logic strengthening first order logic satisfies the Beth definability theorem, ([Sh:199])
a puzzling result. Also the pair (L(Qcfℵ0),L(aa)) of logics satisfies interpolation.
Again a puzzling result. Those cases give place to hope of better results using
related new logics. Returning to infinitary logics, old problems are (and will be our
main concern):
Problem 1.3. Is there a logic L satisfying interpolation such that L<∞,ℵ0 ⊆ L ⊆
L<∞,<∞?
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Problem 1.4. Assume κ is strong limit singular of cofinality ℵ0. Is there a logic
L satisfying interpolation such that Lκ+,ℵ0 ⊆ L ⊆ Lκ+,κ?
Later we have asked ourselves:
Problem 1.5. Is there, for arbitrarily large cardinal κ, a logic L such that:
(a) Lκ,ω ⊆ L and has reasonable closure properties
(b) L has the downward LST property in the sense that every sentence which
has a model N , has a model N of “small” cardinality, moreover M ⊆ N
(c) L has interpolation
(d) undefinability of well ordering (in a strong sense) which means: if M ex-
pands (H (λ),∈) and M |= ψ then for some N we have
(α) N |= ψ
(β) ordN is not well founded
a posteriori we add
(γ) |N | is the union of ℵ0, an internal set of bounded cardinality, i.e. for
some 〈an : n < ω〉, θ,N |= “θ a cardinal such that |an| ≤ θ and
(∀b ∈ N)(
∨
n<ω
N |= “b ∈ an”)
(e) L ⊆ Lθ,θ for a suitable θ.
Problem 1.6. Is there a maximal such logic?
There is a feeling that Lindstro¨m theorem, EF-games and interpolation are in-
herently connected, though I do not know of a formlization of it, the present work
gives evidence strengthening this feeling.
§ 1(B). What is achieved.
We feel that here we reasonably fulfill those old hopes mentioned above, in the
direction of non-compact logics; (recall that by Lindstrom theorem any (nice) logic
stronger than first order logic, fail downward LST to ℵ0 or fail ℵ0-compactness).
Assume for transparency κ = iκ, we find an interesting logic, L
1
κ such that:
⊛1 (A) L
1
κ is a nice logic
(B) it has a reasonable characterization: it is the maximal nice logic,
see Definition 1.9, 1.12 such that (α,<) can be characterized up to
isomorphism by some ψα ∈ L1κ for α < κ, has occurance number
≤ κ, see Definition 1.11 and well ordering is not definable in a
strong way
(C) it satisfies interpolation2 (see ⊞3 above or Definition 1.14 below;
answering an old question on the existence of such logic)
(D) it is between L−1<κ = ∪{Lλ+,ℵ0 : λ < κ} and
L0<κ = ∪{Lλ+,λ+ : λ < κ}, see ⊞0 above or Definition 1.20 below
(E) has many of the good properties of L0κ := L
0
<κ:
(α) downward LST, see ⊞1 above, specifically every ψ ∈ L1κ(τ)
has a model of cardinality < κ
(see some variants in Definition 2.14 below)
2for consequences of interpolation, see [Mak85]
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(β) well ordering is not an expressible3
(γ) addition of theories, see 3.14
(δ) product of (two) theories, see 3.14
(F ) alternative characterization: L1κ is a minimal nice logic L for which
• for any ordinal α < κ we can characterize (α,<) up to
isomorphism by some ψα ∈ L
• we can characterize the class of (A ∪P, A,∈)
where P ⊆ [A]≤µ is an ℵ0-cover (and A ∩P = ∅)
for each µ < κ by some sentence from L
(see Definition 3.6)
• L is ∆-closed, see Definition 3.8
• L has occurance number ≤ κ, see Definition 1.11.
We do not have a generalization of the Feferman-Vaught theorem [FV59] on general
operations and even not the Mostowski one, [Mos52], on reduced products, even
for the product of countably many models, see Theorem 4.10.
Here in §2 we choose a definition of the logic closest to the way we arrive to it
and to the proof. For α, θ < κ we generalize the Ehrenfuecht-Fraisse game allowing
“rescheduling of debts”. This does not give an equivalence relation so we close the
induced relation to an equivalence relation and a sentence, i.e. the class of models
of a sentence is the union of some such equivalence classes; then we prove the basic
properties.
In §3 we deal with the deeper properties as promised in⊛1 above: non-definability
of well ordering, characterization and interpolation.
In §4 we show how close is our logic to L0κ and deal with sums and products. We
intend to continue in [Sh:F1046], in particular concerning to 1.4.
More than once, lecturing on this some in the audience “complain” that this
definition does not sound like a definition of logic. So in [Sh:F1046] we intend to
give presentation close to the ways logic are traditionally defined (we could have
done it for L1κ, too) but our characterization theorem shows that we shall get the
same logic.
The logic L1κ from §1 is quite satisfactory; many of the good properties of L<κ,ℵ0
and interpolation, and a characterization (parallel to Lindstro¨m theorem). But
compared to L<κ,ℵ0 we lose the upward LST.
Question 1.7. Let κ = iκ, is there L such that L
−1
κ ≤ L ≤ L
0
κ satisfying
interpolation and the upward LST theorem?
We intend to deal with this in [Sh:F1046].
§ 1(C). Why characterizations? Note that characterization theorems are cen-
tral for several reasons:
⊛2 (a) per se, uniqueness results are nice, of course
(b) historically - Lindstro¨m theorem has this form
(c) they prove a logic is natural logic
(d) for a logic which lacks such theorem we may well suspect that
3That is, if ψ is a sentence and for every ordinal α for some M,M |= ψ and (PM , <M ) is a
well ordering of order type ≥ α then for some model M of ψ, (PM , <M ) is not a well ordering.
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• there are many relatives of similar good properties, without a
special reason to prefer one or another.
How good is a characterization theorem? Of course, it all depends on the properties
appearing in the characterization being natural and preferably well established.
The situation of having reasonable logics which we can strengthen preseving
their main positive properties but neither seeing a maximal one nor proving such
extension do not exist has been prominent in the area; e.g. the most well established
ones like L(Q) = L(∃≥ℵ1) and also Lκ+,ℵ0 .
Why here we tend to look at strong limit cardinals, in particular, κ = iκ? Note
that in first order formula with a fix finite vocabulary, with predicates only for
transparency the number of sentences of quantifier depth q has order of magnitude
iq, iterated power q times. In infinitary logic, if we like that still there is a sentence
expressing the “quantifier depth ≤ α theory” we need κ = iκ. A price is that for
κ singular, we lose full substitution, and moreover, full closure under conjunctions
of < κ. This is resolved if we demand κ is strong limit regular, i.e. (strongly)
inaccessible, fine but the existence of such cardinals is unprovable in ZFC.
§ 1(D). Directions ignored here. We do not deal here with some other major
directions:
⊛3 (a) ℵ0-compact (nice logic)
(b) logics without negation and continuous logic
(c) almost isomorphism (and absolute logic).
We may look at model theory essentially replacing “isomorphic” by “almost iso-
morphic”, that is isomorphisms by potential isomorphisms, i.e. isomorphism in
some forcing extension. In [Sh:12] we have suggested to reconsider a major theme
in model theory, counting the number of isomorphism types. We call M,N almost-
isomorphic when M,N have (the same vocabulary and) the same L∞,ℵ0 -theory,
equivalently isomorphic in some generic extension. For a theory T let Iai(λ, T )
be |{M/ ≡L∞,ℵ0 : M a model of T of cardinality λ}|. This behaves nicely: if T
has cardinality ≤ λ, is first order or just ⊆ Lλ+,ℵ0 then I˙ai(λ, ψ) ≤ λ < µ ⇒
I˙ai(µ, T ) ≤ I˙ai(λ, T ), (on I˙ai(−, T ) for ℵ0-stable T , see a work of Laskowski-Shelah
in preparation). In [Sh:12] we also define “M is ai-rigid, i.e. a 6= b ∈ M ⇒
(M,a) 6≡L∞,ℵ0 (N, a)” and have downward LST theorem for it. Later Nadel
suggested further to consider homomorphisms, in particular for abelian groups,
see [EM02, Ch.IV,§3,pg.487], more Go¨bel-Shelah [GbSh:880], Go¨bel-Herden-Shelah
[GbHeSh:948]. Barwise characterized the relevant logic, L∞,ℵ0 by absoluteness:
(among logics with satisfaction being absolute under forcing it is maximal).
§ 1(E). Can soft model theory be applied?
What about applications of soft model theory? There are some applications
using compact logics. See [Sh:384] on extending first order logic by second order
quantifiers restricted in some ways. Of course, the expressive power of the logic
depend on the restriction, see the example below. In cofinality logic, L(QcfC) with
C is a class of regular cardinals, we are allowed to say: the formula ϕ(x, y), possibly
with parameters, define a linear order with no last element of cofinality from C,
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recalling that the cofinality of a linear oder I is the minimal cardinality of an
unbounded (equivalently cofinal) subset. If C is non-trivial, this logic is a very
interesting logic (e.g. fully compact), in particular showing what we cannot prove so
full compactness is not sufficient to characterize first order logic. But its expressive
power is weak so we do not expect it to have applications.
In [Sh:384] (where you can find something about the history of the topic) we
prove the compactness of the quantifier (that is for first order logic extended by
it) L ceab = L(Qceab) — quantifying over complete embeddings of one atomless
Boolean ring into another. Moreover, for this logic we prove completeness for a
natural set of axioms. Now consider the problem “can the automorphism groups
of a 1-homogeneous4 Boolean algebra be non-simple5”? Much is known on this
group and, in particular, that it is “almost” simple — see Rubin-Stepanek [Rv89].
It was known that there may exist such Boolean Algebras as by [Sh:b, IV] in some
generic extension, all automorphisms of P(ω)/finite are trivial (i.e. induced by
permutations π of Z such that {n ∈ Z : n ≥ 0 but π(n) < 0} is finite) and van
Dowen note that the group of trivial automorphisms of P(ω)/finite is not simple
(as the subgoup of the automorphisms induced by permutations of ω is a normal
subgroup) and the quotient is isomorphic to (Z,+). Alternatively, Koppelberg
[Kop85] has directly constructed such Boolean Algebras of cardinality ℵ1 assuming
(the more natural assumption) CH. So by the completeness theorem (as the set of
axioms is absolute), as the relevant facts are expressible in L(Qceab), the existence
is proved in ZFC. Some may want to consider a direct proof. It almost certainly
will give more specific desirable information.
Another helpful quantifier is on branches of trees (see [Sh:72]). In Fuchs-Shelah
[FuSh:766] it is used to eliminate the use of diamond, i.e. to prove in ZFC the
existence of valuation domains R such that there are R-modules which are univerasl
(i.e. the family of sub-modules is linearly ordered by inclusion) but not standard.
Note the obvious examples (which are called standard): R itself or appropriate
quotients. Actually the completeness theorem for this logic gives an absoluteness
result which is used.
We believe that quantifiers with completeness and compactness will be useful so
it is worthwhile to find such quantifiers. Hopefully see more in [Sh:800].
∗ ∗ ∗
§ 1(F). Preliminaries.
Notation 1.8. 1) τ denotes a vocabulary, i.e. a set of predicates so each P ∈ τ has
arityτ(P ) < ω places and each function symbol F ∈ τ has arityτ(F ) < ω places;
of course, individual constants are zero-place function symbols and we may write
arity(P ), arity(F ) when τ is clear from the context.
1A) For a structure M let τM be the vocabulary of M , for a predicate P from
τM , P
M is the interpretation of P so an arityτ(P )-place relation on |M |, the universe
of M ; similarly for a function symbol F from τ and in particular for an individual
constant c from τ .
4A Boolean algebra B is 1-homogeneous if it is atomless for every a, b ∈ B \ {0B} we have
B ∼= B ↾ b (equivalently for a, b ∈ B \ {0B , 1B} for some automorphism f of B, f(a) = b)
5That is has no normal subgroup which is neither the full group nor the one-element sub-group
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2) L denotes a logic, see Definition 1.9.
3) x¯, y¯, z¯ denote sequence of variables (with no repetition). Usually x¯ = 〈xi : i < α〉
so α = ℓg(α¯) but even possibly x¯ = 〈xs : s ∈ S〉 and then we let ℓg(x¯) = S.
4) We say τ is a relational vocabulary when it has no function symbol.
Recall
Definition 1.9. 1) A logic L consists of
(a) function τ 7→ L (τ) giving a set of sentences ϕ (or formulas ϕ(x¯), see
1.10 below) for any vocabulary τ ; the function is a class function that is a
definition
(b) |=L , satisfaction, i.e. the relation M |=L ϕ for M a model, ϕ ∈ L (τM )
(c) renaming: the function πˆ, depending on (τ1, τ2, π,L ), is a one-to-one func-
tion from L (τ1) onto L (τ2) when π is an isomorphism from the vocabulary
τ1 onto the vocabulary τ2 (i.e. if P ∈ τ1 ⇒ then π(P ) ∈ τ2 is a predicate
and arityτ1(P ) = arityτ2(π(P )) and similarly for F ∈ τ1)
(d) if π is an isomorphism from the vocabulary τ1 onto the vocabulary τ2 and
M1 is a τ1-model andM2 = π(M1) naturally defined then ϕ ∈ L (τ1(M1))⇒
[M1 |= ϕ⇔M2 |= πˆ(ϕ)]
(e) (isomorphism): if M1,M2 are isomorphic τ -models and ϕ ∈ L (τ) then
M1 |=L ϕ⇔M2 |=L ϕ
(f) (monotonicity): if τ1 ⊆ τ2 then L (τ1) ⊆ L (τ2) and for any τ2-model M2
and ϕ ∈ L (τ1) we have M2 |= ϕ⇔ (M2↾τ1) |= ϕ.
Convention 1.10. We define a formula ϕ = ϕ(x¯) in L (τ) as a sentence in L (τ ∪
{ci : i < ℓg(x¯)}) with ci(i < α) pairwise distinct individual constants not from τ
and if ϕ(x¯) ∈ L (τ) and a¯ ∈ ℓg(x¯)M then M |=L ϕ[a¯] means M+ |=L ϕ where M+
is the expansion of M by cM
+
i = ai for i < ℓg(x¯), in fact, ℓg(x¯) can be any index
set.
Definition 1.11. For a logic L , the occurance number oc(L ) of L is the minimal
cardinal κ (or ∞) such that L (τ) = ∪{L (τ ′) : τ ′ ⊆ τ is of cardinality < κ} for
any vocabulary τ .
Definition 1.12. We say a logic L is nice when:
(a) (α) applying predicates: if P ∈ τ is an n-place predicate then
P (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ L (τ) is a formula of L (τ)
(β) equality: x0 = x1 ∈ L (τ), i.e. for any individual constants c0, c1 ∈ τ
there is ϕ ∈ L (τ) such that M |= ϕ iff cM0 = c
M
1
(γ) applying6 functions: for an n-place function symbol F ∈ τ ,
x0 = F (x1, . . . , xn−1) is a formula of L (τ)
(b) (α) L is closed under conjunction, i.e. for every ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L (τ) there is
ϕ3 ∈ L (τ) such that for every τ -model M we have:
M |= ϕ3 iff M |= ϕ1 and M |= ϕ2
6We may put together clauses (a)(α) and (a)(γ) allowing p(σ0(x¯), . . . , σn−1(x¯)), σℓ a term; the
choice is immaterial.
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(β) L is closed under existential quantifier, (∃x), i.e. for any ϕ ∈ L (τ∪
{c}), c an individual constant not in τ , there is ψ ∈ L (τ) such
that for any τ -model M we have M |= ϕ iff M+ |= ϕ for some
(τ ∪ {c})-expansion M+ of µ
(γ) L is closed under negation, i.e. for any ϕ ∈ L (τ) there is ψ ∈ L (τ)
such that for any τ -model M,M 1L ϕ⇔M |=L ψ
(c) restricting a sentence ψ to a predicate P, ψ↾P ∈ L (τ) when ψ ∈ L (τ),
where P ∈ τ is a unary predicate, and τ is a relational vocabulary, see
Definition 1.15, 1.8(4), (but see clause (d)(γ) below)
(d) weak substitution, that is, has substitution for very simple schemes, see
1.17 below.
Remark 1.13. 1) Above we prefer (a)(γ) on using R′(σ0, . . . , σm−1) where each
σℓ = σℓ(x¯) is a term.
2) Below we can define the multi-sort vesrion.
Definition 1.14. 1) A logic L satisfies interpolation when for any sentence ψ1 ∈
L (τ1), ϕ2 ∈ L (τ2) and τ = τ1 ∩ τ , we have: if ϕ1 ⊢ ϕ2, i.e. for any (τ1 ∪ τ2)-model
M,M |= ϕ1 ⇒ M 6= ϕ2, then for some sentence ψ ∈ L (τ) we have ϕ1 ⊢ ψ and
ψ ⊢ ϕ2.
2) Naturally definition for multi-sort languages.
Definition 1.15. 1) We say ϕ ≡ ψ↾P where ϕ, ψ ∈ L (τ) or pedantically7 ϕ =
ψ↾τP where P is a unary predicate in the vocabulary τ, τ is of minimal cardinality
such that ψ ∈ L (τ) when :
for any τ -models M,M |= (ψ↾τP ) iff P
M is non-empty, closed under FM for
every function symbol from τ and M↾PM |= ψ, see below.
2) For a τ -model M and unary predicate P let N = M↾τ be the τ -model with
universe PM , for n-place predicate Q ∈ τ we have QN = QM ∩ n|N | and for
n-place function symbol F ∈ τ, FN (a¯) = b⇔ a¯ ∈ n|N | ∧ b ∈ N ∧ FM (a¯) = b.
Definition 1.16. Let L be a logic.
0) atL (τ) is the set of atomic formulas ϕ(x¯) from 1.12(a); bsL (τ) = {ϕ,¬ϕ : ϕ ∈
atL (τ); we may omit L if clear from the context.
1) Let ϕ ⊢L ψ where ϕ, ψ ∈ L (τ) mean that M |= ϕ ⇒ M |= ψ for any τ -model
(this does not depend on τ by Definition 1.9).
2) We say ϑ¯ is an (L , τ1, τ2)-interpretation scheme when:
(a) L a logic
(b) τ1, τ2 vocabularies
(c) ϑ¯ = 〈ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) : ϕ(x¯) ∈ atL (τ2)〉
(d) ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) is a formula in L (τ1) so ϕ = P (x0, . . . , xn−1), x¯ = 〈xℓ : ℓ < n〉 or
ϕ = (x0 = F (x1, . . . , xn)), x¯ = 〈xℓ : ℓ ≤ n〉.
2A) Above we say the ((L1, τ1, τ2)-interpretation) scheme ϑ¯ is simple when ϑx0=x1
has the form (x0 = x1).
7of course ψ↾τ is not uniquely determined. We may like to be more liberal in restricting a
model, in 1.8(1) allow FM to be a partial function for F a function symbol from τ(M). We may
combine this with restriction (see Definition 1.15), then we still have to demand PM 6= ∅ (except
if we go further and allow empty models). Note M |= “¬F (a¯) = b” when FM (a¯) is not well
defined.
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3) For ϑ¯ as above we say N = Nϑ¯[M ] =M1[ϑ¯] when
(a) |N | = |M |/ϕ=(x0, x1) which means
• EMϕ= = {(a, b) :M |= ϕ(a, b)} is an equivalence relation on |M | or just
some non-empty subset
• |N | = {a/EMϕ= : a ∈M and M |= ϕ=[a, a]}
(b) N |= ϕ[a¯]⇔M |= ϑϕ(x¯)[a¯] for ϕ(x¯) ∈ at(τ2) and a¯ ∈
ω>M of length ℓg(x¯)
(note: not for every such ϑ¯ and τ1-model M1 is Nϑ¯[M2] well defined, we need that
ϕ=(−,−) defines an equivalence relation on |M1|, which is a congruence relation for
the τ2-relations and functions we define and, of course, the definition of functions
gives ones, similarly below; but if ϑ is simple this problem does not arise).
4) We say the logic L satisfies full substitution8 when: if τ1, τ2 are vocabularies,
ϑ¯ = 〈ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) : ϕ(x¯) ∈ atL (τ2)〉 is a simple (L , τ1, τ2)-interpretation scheme, and
ψ2 ∈ L (τ2), then there is ψ1 ∈ L (τ1) such that: if M1 = Nϑ¯[M2], see below, so
Mℓ is a τℓ-models for ℓ = 1, 2 then M1 |= ψ1 ⇔M2 |= ψ2.
5) We say that the logic L satisfies substitution when we require ϑ¯ to be simple.
Definition 1.17. 1) We say ϑ¯ is a weak (L , τ1, τ2)-scheme (but L is immaterial
so can be omitted) when :
(a) τ1, τ2 are vocabularies
(b) ϑ¯ = 〈ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) : ϕ(x¯) ∈ at(τ2)〉
(c) the formulas ϑϕ(x¯) are atomic (on conjunction of two atomic for equality)
formulas in which we substitute some variables by individual constants,
moreover:
(α) if ϕ(x¯) is equal to (x0 = x1) so ℓg(x¯) = 2 then ϑϕ(x¯) = (x0 = x1 ∧
Pϕ(x¯)(x0, c¯ϕ(x¯))
(β) if ϕ(x¯) = P (x¯), so P ∈ τ2 a predicate then
•1 ϑ(x¯) = Qϕ(x¯)(x¯, c¯) where
•2 Qϕ(x¯) a predicate from τ1
•3 c¯ a sequence of individual constants from τ1
•4 so arityτ2(P ) = ℓg(x¯), arityτ1(Qp) = ℓg(x¯) + ℓg(c¯)
(γ) if ϕ(x¯) = (x0 = F (x1, . . . , xn)) so F ∈ τ2 a function symbol then
•1 ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) is (x0 = HF (x1, . . . , xn, c¯F )) or QF (x0, . . . , xn, c¯F )
•2, •3 as above.
2) We say L has weak substitution when as in Definition 1.16(4), but restricting
ourselves to weak schemes.
Remark 1.18. 1) The meaning of 1.17(1)(c)(γ) is
(∗)1 • ϑϕ(x¯)(x¯) = (x0 = HF (x1, . . . , xn, c¯F ))
• HF ∈ τ1 a function symbol of arity n+ ℓg(c¯F )
• c¯F a sequence of individual constants from
or
(∗)2 similarly using Q′F (x0, . . . , xn, c¯F ).
8We do not use full substitution; as for κ singular L0κ,L
1
κ are not closed under full substitution
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2) Why in 1.17(1)(c) the “moreover”, i.e. why is the second version stronger? As
we demand the c¯ϕ’s to be as in the end. Does not matter whether we ask it or not.
We could further demand c¯ϕ = 〈c∗〉 for all ϕ¯ ∈ at(τ2).
3) In “weak (L , τ1, τ2)-scheme” (hence in “weak substitution”) we may use first
order formulas (instead of atomic), i.e. that is our results will not be affected by
this change in the definition.
4) Also, in “weak(L , τ1, τ2)-scheme” we may add c¯ϕ = 〈c∗〉, for one c∗, and/or
demand ϑ¯ is simple. For the later change in the proof of 3.4, we have to say that
“without loss of generality all ‖Mα,n‖ have cardinality ≥ µ1 and in fact = µ1”, for
this we need claim version of LST, see so have to add the assumption “L satisfies
suitable version of LST.
Definition 1.19. 1) For logics L1,L2 let L1 ⊆ L2 mean that: L1(τ) ⊆ L2(τ)
for any vocabulary τ and M |=L1 ϕ is equivalent to M |=L2 ϕ when ϕ ∈ L (τ) and
M is a τ -model.
2) For logics L1,L2 let L1 ≤ L2 or L2 is stronger than L2 means that for
every τ and ϕ ∈ L1(τ) there is ψ ∈ L2(τ) such that ϕ, ψ are equivalent, i.e.
M |=L1 ϕ⇔M |=L2 ψ for any τ -model M .
3) We say that the logics L1,L2 are equivalent, L1 ≡ L2 when L1 ≤ L2 and
L2 ≤ L1.
Definition 1.20. 1) The logic Lκ,θ for κ ≥ θ ≥ ℵ0 is defined like first order logic,
but Lκ,θ(τ) is the closure of the set of atomic formulas under ¬ϕ,
∧
i<α
ϕi where
α < κ and (∀x0, . . . , xi, . . .)i<αϕ where α < θ; a sentence is a formula with no free
variables and satisfaction is defined naturally.
1A) First order logic is L = Lℵ0,ℵ0 .
2) Let Lκ,θ,γ(τ) be the set of formulas ϕ(x¯) ∈ Lκ,θ(τ) of depth ≤ γ; similarly in
the other cases.
3) Let L0≤κ,≤θ = Lκ+,θ+ ,L
0
<κ,<θ = ∪{L
0
≤κ1,≤θ1
: κ1 < κ, θ1 < θ}; similarly
L0≤κ,≤θ,<γ, etc.
4) Let L−1κ = L
0
<κ,ℵ0
,L0κ = L
0
<κ,<κ.
5) We define the logic L∞,θ,γ by induction on the ordinal γ such that L∞,θ,γ(τ) is
a set of cardinality ≤ iγ(|τ |+ ℵ0), increasing with γ as follows:
• for γ = 0, the set of basic sentences
• for γ limit, it is ∪{L∞,θ,β(τ) : β < γ}
• for γ = β + 1 it is the set of sentences of the form (∃x¯)
∧
i<α
ϕi(x¯) or its
negation where ℓg(x¯) < θ, ϕi(x¯) a formula from L∞,θ,β(τ) with α < iβ(|τ |+
ℵ0).
Observation 1.21. If κ is strong limit singular, then there is no logic L such
that:
(a) L−1κ ≤ L ≤ L
0
κ
(b) L satisfies full substitution.
Note that
Claim 1.22. 1) In Definition 1.20 for κ singular, Lκ+,θ ≤ Lκ,θ ⊆ Lκ+,θ, i.e. every
sentence in Lκ+,θ(τ) is equivalent to one in Lκ,θ (and Lκ,θ(τ) ⊆ Lκ+,θ(τ)), so it
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seems pointless to allow κ to be singular as was originally done. Still this is the
tradition and we use it.
2) If κ is a regular cardinal then the logics L0κ,θ and L
0
<κ,θ are equal.
3) If κ = iκ then L
0
<κ,<κ,<κ = L
0
<κ,<κ.
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§ 2. The logic L1κ
Our main definition is
Definition 2.1. For a vocabulary τ, τ -modelsM1,M2, set Γ formulas in the vocab-
ulary τ in any logic (each with finitely many free variables if not said otherwise (see
2.3(4)), cardinal θ and ordinal α we define a game a = aΓ,θ,α[M1,M2] as follows,
and using (M1, b¯1), (M2, b2) with their natural meaning when Dom(b¯1) = Dom(b¯2).
(A) The moves are indexed by n < ω (but every actual play is finite), just
before the n-th move we have a state sn = (A
1
n, A
2
n, h
1
n, h
2
n, gn, βn, n)
(B) s = (A1, A2, h1, h2, g, β, n) = (A1s , A
2
s , h
1
s , h
2
s , gs, βs, ns) is a state (or n-state
or (θ, n)-state or (θ,< ω)-state) when:
(a) Aℓ ∈ [Mℓ]≤θ for ℓ = 1, 2
(b) β ≤ α so an ordinal
(c) hℓ is a function from Aℓ into ω
(d) g is a partial one-to-one function from M1 to M2 and let g
1
s = g
1 =
gs = g and let g
2
s = g
2 = (g1s)
−1,
(e) Dom(gℓ) ⊆ Aℓ for ℓ = 1, 2
(f) g preserves satisfaction of the formulas in Γ and their negations, i.e.
for ϕ(x¯) ∈ Γ and a¯ ∈ ℓg(x¯)Dom(g) we haveM1 |= ϕ[a¯]⇔M2 |= ϕ[g(a¯)]
(g) if a ∈ Dom(gℓ) then hℓ(a) < n
(C) we define the state s = s0 = s
0
α by letting ns = 0, A
1
s = ∅ = A
1
s , βs =
α, h1s = ∅ = h
2
s , gs = ∅; so really s depend only on α (but in general, this
may not be a state for our game as possibly for some sentence ψ ∈ Γ we
have M1 |= ψ ⇔M2 |= ¬ψ)
(D) we say that a state t extends a state s when Aℓs ⊆ A
ℓ
t, h
ℓ
s ⊆ h
ℓ
t for ℓ = 1, 2
and gs ⊆ gt, βs > βt, ns < nt; we say t is a successor of s if in addition
nt = ns + 1
(E) in the n-th move
the anti-isomorphism player (AIS) chooses (βn+1, ιn, A
′
n) such that:
ιn ∈ {1, 2}, βn+1 < βn and Aιnn ⊆ A
′
n ∈ [Mιn ]
≤θ,
the isomorphism player (ISO) chooses a state sn+1 such that
• sn+1 is a successor of sn
• Aιnsn+1 = A
′
n
• A3−ιnsn+1 = A
3−ιn
sn
∪Dom(g3−ιnsn+1 )
• if a ∈ A′n\A
ιn
sn
then hιnsn+1(a) ≥ n+ 1
• Dom(gιnsn+1) = {a ∈ A
ιn
sn
: hιnsn(a) < n+ 1} so it includes Dom(g
ιn
sn
)
• βsn+1 = βn+1.
(F ) • the play ends when one of the player has no legal moves (always occur
as βn < βn−1) and then this player loses, this may occur for n = 0
• for α = 0 we stipulate that ISO wins iff s0α is a state.
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Discussion 2.2. 1) This is a parallel to EF-games. Note that we like on the one
hand the game to have ≤ ω moves, really each play has < ω moves and deal with
sets of cardinality ≤ θ and on the other hand we do not like well ordering to be
definable, i.e. allowM1 to be well ordered whileM2 to be non-well ordered but still
the ISO player wins. We do this by “rescheduling our debts”, i.e. using the hn’s.
Definition 2.3. 1) Let E 0,τΓ,θ,α be the class {(M1,M2) : M1,M2 are τ -models and
in the game aΓ,θ,α[M1,M2] the ISO player has a winning strategy} where Γ is a set
of formulas in the vocabulary τ , each with finitely many free variables.
2) E 1,τΓ,θ,α is the closure of E
0,τ
Γ,θ,α to an equivalence relation (on the class of τ -models).
3) Above we may replace Γ by qf(τ) which means Γ = the set at(τ) or bs(τ) formulas
in the vocabulary τ .
4) Above if we omit τ we mean τ = τΓ and if we omit Γ we mean bs(τ). Abusing
notation we may say M1,M2 are E
0,τ
Γ,θ,α-equivalent.
Fact 2.4. Assume aΓ,θ,α[M1,M2] is well defined and M1,M2 are τ -models.
1) The game aΓ,θ,α[M1,M2] is a determined game and is without memory, i.e.
during a play, being a winning situation does not depend on the history, just on
the current state, also only Mℓ↾τΓ are relevant.
2a) The relation E 0Γ,θ,α holds for (M1,M2) when M1,M2 are isomorphic τ -models.
2b) If M1 ∼=M ′1,M2
∼=M ′2 then M1E
0
Γ,θ,αM2 ⇔M
′
1E
0
Γ,θ,αM
′
2.
2c) E 0Γ,θ,α is reflexive and symmetric.
3) The relation E 1Γ,θ,α is an equivalence relation on the class of τ -models.
4) If α is a limit ordinal then M1E
0
Γ,θ,αM2 iff [β < α⇒M1E
0
Γ,θ,βM2].
5) E 1Γ,θ,α has ≤ iα+1(|Γ|+ θ) equivalence classes.
6) If τ1 ⊆ τ2,Γ1 ⊆ Γ2, θ1 ≤ θ2 and α1 ≤ α2 andM1E
0,τ2
Γ2,θ2,α2
M2 then M1E
0,τ1
Γ1,θ1,α1
M2.
Proof. 1) Obvious.
2a) Let g∗ be an isomorphism from M1 onto M2. Now a winning strategy for the
player ISO in aΓ,θ,α[M1,M2] is to preserve “gsn ⊆ g∗”.
2b) Should be clear.
2c) Let us check.
Reflexivity:
Follows from part (2a) as M ∼=M .
Symmetry:
Reading the definition carefully it should be clear.
3),4) Easy, too.
5) We prove by induction on α that there is an equivalence relation E 2Γ,θ,α on
the class of τ(Γ)-models such that M1E
2
Γ,θ,αM2 ⇒ M1E
0
Γ,θ,αM2 and E
2
Γ,θ,α has
≤ iα+1(|Γ|+θ) equivalence classes. For α = 0, recall clause (F) of Definition 2.1 so
easilyM1E
0
Γ,θ,αM2 means that Γℓ = {ϕ[a¯] : Mℓ |= ϕ and ϕ ∈ Γ, ϕ is a sentence} does
not depend on ℓ; clearly E 0Γ,θ,α is an equivalence relation with ≤ 2
|Γ| equivalence
classes and E 1Γ,θ,α = E
0
Γ,θ,α; let E
2
Γ,θ,α = E
0
Γ,θ,α. For α a limit ordinal use part (4) and
choose E 2Γ,θ,α = ∩{E
2
Γ,θ,β : β < α} recalling iα(|Γ|+ θ) = Σ{iβ(|Γ|+ θ) : β < α}.
Lastly, for α = β + 1 use the induction hypothesis and iα(|Γ|+ θ) = 2
iβ(|Γ|+θ).
Alternatively use Lθ+,θ+,α, i.e. use the proof of 2.8, when we replace iα(|Γ| + θ)
by i(|Γ|+θ)+ .
6) Easy. 2.4
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Definition 2.5. We define the logic L1≤θ as follows: a sentence ψ ∈ L≤θ(τ) iff
the sentence is defined using (or by) a triple (qf(τ1), θ, α) which means: τ1 a sub-
vocabulary of τ of cardinality ≤ θ and α < θ+ and for some sequence 〈Mα : α <
α(∗)〉 of τ1-models of length α(∗) ≤ iα+1(θ) we have: M |= ψ iff M is E 1qf(τ1),θ,α-
equivalent to Mα for some α < α(∗).
2) Let L1κ = ∪{L
1
≤θ : θ < κ} so L
1
θ+ = L
1
≤θ.
Remark 2.6. 1) The present definition of the logic (2.5) is interesting mainly for κ
strong limit such that κ = iκ and it seems to me that it makes the presentation
transparent. Note that L1≤θ is similar to the set of formulas of quantifier depth
< θ+.
2) Why? Just note that for vocabulary τ of cardinality ≤ θ,L1≤θ(τ) has cardinality
iθ+ , and it helps to have arbitrary Boolean combinations of formulas of a fix quan-
tifier depth [< θ+]. Note that if ϕ(x¯) ∈ L1κ(τ) has infinitely many free variables,
we cannot “close” it to a sentence.
3) We may instead define L1,∗≤θ by: ψ ∈ L
1
≤θ(τ) iff for some τ
′ ⊆ τ of cardinality
≤ θ and some sequence 〈Mi : i < i(∗)〉 of τ ′-models of cardinality ≤ 2θ and some
γ < θ+ we have: a τ -model M satisfies ψ iff ME 1qf(τ ′),θ,γMi for some i.
Claim 2.7. 1) L1≤θ is a nice logic, see Definition 1.9.
2) The logic L1≤θ has full substitution.
3) L1≤θ(τ) has cardinality ≤ |τ |
θ + iθ+ for any vocabulary τ .
4) If κ = iκ then L
1
κ is a nice logic, L
1
κ(τ) has cardinality κ whenever τ is a
vocabulary of cardinality < κ and L1κ(τ) has cardinality |τ |
<κ+κ for any vocabulary
τ .
5) In part (4), if κ is regular then the logic L1κ has full substitution.
6) If θ, α < κ and τ is a vocabulary of cardinality < κ then for any set U of
E 1qf(τ),θ,α-equivalence classes for some ψ ∈ L
1
κ(τ) we have {M : M/E
1
qf(τ),θ,α ∈
U } = {M :M a τ-model of ψ}.
Proof. 1),2) Just check definition 1.9, 1.12, 1.16(5) but still we elaborate the rela-
tively more substantial 1.12, 1.16(5).
Clause (a): Atomic formulas
Just note that if M1E
0
qf(τ),θ,αM2 for α = 0 (any θ) then M1,M2 satisfies the
same τ -atomic sentences.
Clause (b)(α): Conjunction, (similarly Disjunction)
Just note that if ϕℓ is defined using (qf(τℓ), θℓ, αℓ) and τ = τ1∪τ2, θ = max{θ1, θ2}, α =
max{α1, α2} then the equivalence relation E 1qf(τ),θ,α refine the equivalence relation
E 1qf(τℓ),θℓ,αℓ
for ℓ = 1, 2.
Clause (b)(β): Existential Quantifier
Assume ϕ ∈ L1κ(τ ∪ {c}) is defined by the triple (qf(τ ∪ {c}), θ, α) and ϕ(x) is
the corresponding formula L1κ(τ) and ∃xϕ(x) is the naturally defined sentence.
Now if M1,M2 are E
0
qf(τ),θ,α+1-equivalent τ -models then M1 |= ∃xϕ(x) iff M2 |=
(∃x)ϕ(x) by the definition of the game. Hence this holds for “M1,M2 are E 1qf(τ),θ,α+1-
equivalent τ -models”.
Clause (b)(γ): Negation
Obvious by the definition because for any vocabulary τ of cardinality ≤ θ the
equivalence relation E 1qf(τ),θ,α has ≤ iα+1(θ) equivalence classes by 2.4(5).
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Clause (c): Restricting to a unary predicate P
Easily if ψ is defined using (qf(τ), θ, α) and without loss of generality P ∈ τ
then so is ψ↾P .
Clause (d): We prove more: Full substitution:
Assume we are given vocabularies τ1, τ2 and consider substituting ϕP (x0, . . . , xarityτ2 (P )−1
) ∈
L1≤θ(τ0) for P ∈ τ2 treating F (x0, . . . , xarity(F )−1) = xarity(F ) as an (arityτ2(F )+1)-
place predicate. Let ϕP be defined by (qf(τ
+arity(P )), θP , αP ) and let α0 = sup{αP :
P ∈ τ2}.
We are given ψ ∈ L1≤θ(τ1) and we shall find ψ
′ ∈ L1≤θ(τ2) which says that if we
substitute ϕP (x0, . . . , xarityτ2 (P )
) instead P (x0, . . .) in ψ for every P ∈ τ1, we get
(up to equivalence) ψ′. Let ψ be defined by (qf(τ1), θ1, α1). Let α2 = α1 + α0 and
easily there is ψ′ as required defined by (qf(τ2), θ1, α2). 2.7
Claim 2.8. 1) Let κ = iθ+ .
L1≤θ ≤ L
0
κ, i.e. every formula of L
1
≤θ is equivalent to, hence can be looked at, as a
formula of L0κ.
2) L−1≤θ ≤ L
1
≤θ.
Remark 2.9. For many purposes we identify them, i.e. say L1≤θ ⊆ L
0
κ; this gives
another reasonable version of subformulas.
Proof. 1) We first prove:
⊞1 if s is a state in the game aqf(τ),θ,α[M1,M2] and β = βs, τ = τ(Mℓ), a¯1 =
〈a1ε : ε < ε(∗)〉 ∈
θ+>(M1) list Dom(gs) and a¯2 = 〈a2ε : ε < ε(∗)〉 where
a2ε = gs(a
1
ε) and M2 |= ϕ[a¯1] ⇔ M2 |= ϕ[a¯2] for every ϕ = ϕ(〈xε : ε <
ε(∗)〉) ∈ L∗β :=
⋃
ζ<β
L(iζ(θ+|τ |))+,θ+(τ), or just ϕ ∈ L
∗
β = L∞,θ+,β(τ), see
1.20(5), then s is a winning state for the player ISO in the game.
[Why? We prove this by induction on β. First, for β = 0 this is trivial as s
is a state. Second, for β limit, any choice of the AIS player includes an ordinal
γ = βns+1 < β, so the ISO player may “pretend” that the given state s has
βs = γ + 1 and use the induction hypothesis. Third, if β = γ + 1, let the AIS
player make his choice (βns+1, ι, A). Now ISO has to extend g
ι
s adding some ≤ θ
elements of Mι to its domain, the elements in {a ∈ Dom(gιs) : h
ι
s(a) < ns + 1} ∪A,
let b¯ι list them. Let x¯ = 〈xε : ε < ε(∗)〉 and let y¯ = 〈yε : ε < ℓg(b¯ι)〉 and define
ϕ∗(y¯, x¯) =
∧
{ϕ(y¯, x¯) ∈ L∗γ :Mι |= ϕ[b¯, a¯ι]}.
So Mι |= ϕ∗[b¯, a¯ι] hence Mι |= (∃y¯)ϕ∗(y¯, a¯ι) hence by the assumption of ⊞1
we have M3−ι |= “(∃y¯)ϕ∗(y¯, a¯3−ι)” hence there is b¯3−ι ∈ ℓg(b¯ι)(M3−ι) such that
M3−ι |= ϕ∗[b¯3−ι, a¯3−ι].
Now the player ISO can make its move getting the state t, a successor of s such
that gt = gs ∪ {〈b
1
ε, b
2
ε〉 : ε < ℓg(y¯)〉, gt maps b¯1 to b¯2 and nt = ns + 1 and βt = γ;
clearly possible. As the ordinal βns+1 chosen by the AIS is ≤ γ also t is as required
in ⊞1 but so, by the induction hypothesis also it is a winning state.]
Let
⊞2 Eτ,θ,α = {(M1,M2) : M1,M2 are τ -models satisfying the same sentences
from L∗α}.
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Now we shall prove ⊞3 and by ⊞3(d) we are done.
⊞3 (a) Eτ,θ,α is an equivalence relation with ≤ (iα+1(θ + |τ |)) equivalence
classes
(b) Eτ,θ,α is an equivalence relation including {(M1,M2) :M1,M2 are
τ -models such that the player ISO wins in aqf(τ),θ,α[M1,M2]}
(c) Eτ,α,θ refines the equivalence relation E
1
qf(τ),θ,α
(d) E 1qf(τ),θ,α has ≤ iα+1(θ + |τ |)-equivalence classes.
[Why? Clause (a) follows from the number of such sentences being ≤ iα(θ + |τ |),
clause (b) follows by ⊞1, clause (c) follows from (b) and the definitions of E
0
qf(τ),θ,α
and E 1qf(τ),θ,α. Lastly, clause (d) follows from clauses (b) + (c).
2) Easy. 2.8
Remark 2.10. 1) The proof above may seem wasteful but for our purposes this is
immaterial.
2) We can do better as follows, i.e. another proof of 2.8 runs as follows:
By induction on the formula. Without loss of generality we deal with a formula
ΘN,d¯,θ,α,Γ(x¯) by induction on β ≤ α we prove:
⊞1 if n ∈ [−1, ω) and γ(1), γ(2) < θ+, b¯ ∈ γ(2)N,hℓ : γ(ℓ) → ω letting x¯ =
〈xi : i < γ(2)〉;uℓ ⊆ γ(ℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2,g a one-to-one mapping from u1
onto u2 (so n = −1 ⇒ γ(1), γ(2) = 0) then for some formula ϕ(z¯, x¯) =
ϕ0
N,d¯,θ,α,Γ,h1,h2,g,β
(x¯) ∈ L0κ we have: for any model M of the vocabulary of
N and c¯ ∈ (ℓg(d¯))M and a¯ ∈ ℓg(b¯)M letting
• A1n = Rang(c¯), A
2
n = Rang(d¯)
• gn has domain {ci : i ∈ u} and gn(ci) = dg(i) for i ∈ u
• hℓn(ci) = dhℓ(i)
the following are equivalent:
(i) M |= ϕ[c¯, a¯]
(ii) (An, Bn, h
1
n, h
2
n, gn, β) is a winning position for the equivalence player
in the game aN,θ,α,Γ[(M, c¯), (N, d¯)]
⊞2 similarly a formula ϕ
1
N,c¯,θ,α,Γ,h,h′,β(z¯, x¯) expressing situation after the AIS
player moves.
The proof is straightforward.
The Crucial Claim 2.11. We have Mn ≡L1
θ
Mω for n < ω and even Mn |=
ψ[a¯]⇔Mω |= ψ[a¯] when:
(a) ψ(z¯) ∈ L1≤θ(τ) a formula
(b) Mn ≺L
∂+,θ+
Mn+1 where ∂ = iθ+
(c) Mω :=
⋃
n<ω
Mn
(d) a¯ ∈ ℓg(z¯)(M0)
(e) τ = τ(Mn) for n < ω.
Remark 2.12. In fact the logic L0∂+,θ+,θ+ suffice, see Definition 1.20(2).
20 SAHARON SHELAH
Proof. Without loss of generality |τ | ≤ θ. We shall prove by induction on β < θ+
the following
⊞β s is a winning state for the ISO player in the game aqf(τ),θ,α[Mn,Mω] when
for some k we have
(a) s is a state in this game
(b) n ≤ k < ω
(c) βs = β
(d) Rang(g2s) ⊆Mk
(e) if b ∈ A2s then b ∈Mh2
s
(b)
(f) letting a¯1 list Dom(gs) and a¯
2 be 〈gs(a1i ) : i < ℓg(a¯
1)〉 and λβ = iβ(θ)
for every ϕ(x¯) ∈ Lλ+
β
,θ+ we have Mk |= ϕ[a¯
1]⇔Mω |= ϕ[a¯2].
The case s = s0β , the initial state, suffice to prove the desired result.
First Case: β = 0.
Trivial.
Second Case: β a limit ordinal.
If the AIS makes its move choosing (A, ι, β1), the ISO player may pretend βs =
β+1 and use the induction hypothesis, this is O.K. as β < β+1, as in proving 2.8.
Third Case: β = γ + 1.
As in the proof of 2.8. 2.11
We can sum up the easy properties but first we present two definitions.
Definition 2.13. 1) We say that N code [N ]≤λ when for some two-place predicate
R we have {set(b,N) : b ∈ N} is a cofinal subset of ([N ]≤λ,⊆).
2) In this case for b ∈ N let set(b,N) = setR(b,N) = {a : aRNb} and if R is clear
from the context we may omit it.
For our results it seems helpful to define some variants of “L satisfies the downward
LST”.
Definition 2.14. Let L be a logic, τ0 a vocabulary ψ0 ∈ L (τ0) a sentence with
τ0 of minimal cardinality or T ⊆ L (τ0), i.e. a set of sentences with |τ0| minimal.
1) L satisfies LSTι<κ when for every vocabulary τ of cardinality < κ and ϕ ∈ L (τ)
we have LSTι<κ(ϕ), see below; if ι = 0 we may omit it.
If κ = λ+ we may write “λ” instead “< κ”. LSTι<κ(ψ) means LST
ι
<κ({ψ})
similarly below and LSTι<κ(≤ θ) means LST
ι
<κ(T ) when |T | ≤ θ; the reader may
concentrate on the case κ = λ+.
2) For ι = 0, let LSTι<κ(T ) means: if T has a model N of cardinality ≥ κ then it
has a model M of cardinality λ for arbitrary large cardinals λ < κ.
3) If ι = 1, similarly but M ⊆ N (moreover can demand A ⊆ M for a given
A ∈ [N ]<κ.
4) For ι = 2, let LSTι<κ(T ) means: if N is a model of T of cardinality ≥ κ then
for arbitrarily large λ < κ we have: if N+ is an expansion of N and τ(N+) has
cardinality ≤ λ then some M+ ⊆ N+ of cardinality λ satisfies M = M+↾τT is a
model of T .
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5) For ι = 3, as in ι = 2, but we further assume that N+ code [N ]≤λ, see 2.13
below and we further conclude that for some 〈dn : n < ω〉 ∈ ω(M+) we have
|M+| = ∪{set(dn, N+) : n < ω}.
6) We define LSTι,∗<κ(T ) similarly but for a pregiven µ < κ can demand ‖M‖ =
‖M‖µ and similarly LSTι,∗<κ.
Conclusion 2.15. Assume θ < κ = iκ.
1) L1≤θ is a nice logic with full substitution, see Definition 1.12.
2) L1κ is a nice logic and if κ is regular (equivalently strongly inaccessible) then it
has full subsitution.
3) L−1κ ≤ L
1
κ ≤ L
0
κ, in fact Lθ+,ℵ0 ≤ L
1
≤θ ≤ Liθ+ ,θ+ (really L
1
≤θ ≤ Liθ+ ,θ+,θ+ and
even ≤ L∞,θ+,θ+).
4) L1κ satisfies the following versions of the downward LST:
(a) every sentence ψ ∈ L1κ which has a model has a model of cardinality < κ
(b) L1κ has LST
ι
<κ for ι ≤ 3 (see 2.14 above)
(c) for every ψ ∈ L1κ there is ∂ < κ such that: if N is a model of ψ of cardinality
λ and µ = µ<∂ ≤ λ or at least µ =
∑
n<ω
µn ≤ λ and (µn)<∂ = µn for n < ω
then some submodel M of N of cardinality µ is a model of ψ.
Proof. 1) By 2.7.
2) Follows as L1≤θ is ⊆-increasing with θ and the defintion of L
1
κ in Definition 2.5(2).
3) We have L1≤θ ≤ Liθ+ ,θ+ (and moreover L
1
≤θ ≤ Liθ+ ,θ+,θ+) by 2.8. So by the
definition, L1κ ≤ L
0
κ. Note that if M1,M2 are E
1
qf(τ),ℵ0,α
-equivalent then M1 |= ψ ⇔
M2 |= ψ for every ψ ∈ Li+α ,ℵ0,α hence Lθ+,ℵ0 ≤ L
1
≤θ and so by the definitions,
L−1κ ≤ L
1
κ.
4) Clause (a) follows by part (3) and the parallel results on Lλ+,θ+ of Hanf (see,
e.g. [Dic85]). Clause (b) follows by 2.11. 2.15
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§ 3. Serious properties of L1κ
First we prove a strong form of non-definability of well ordering.
Claim 3.1. Let κ = iκ so a strong limit cardinal.
1) Property (d) of Problem 1.5 holds.
2) Moreover, if (A) then (B) where τ is a vocabulary to which the predicates P,<,R
(unary, binary, binary) belongs and:
(A) (a) ψ ∈ L1≤θ(τ) is defined using (qf(τ), θ, α)
(b) θ ≥ |τ |
(c) ∂ = iα+1(θ)
(d) µ = 2∂
(e) M |= ψ
(f) (PM , <M ) ∼= ((2µ)+, <)
(g) M is a τ-model satisfying:
{{a : aRMb} : b ∈M} = [M ]≤µ
or just the former family is cofinal in the latter family (both ordered
by inclusion)
(B) there are a τ-model N and a sequence 〈bn : n < ω〉 such that:
(α) N |= ψ
(β) (PN , <N) is not well ordered
(γ) bn ∈ N and N |= (∀x)(xRbn → xRbn+1)
(δ) N |= (∀b)
∨
n<ω
[bRbn].
Proof. 1) Follows by (2).
2) Without loss of generality |M | is an ordinal, PM = (2µ)+ and <M is the
usual order of the ordinals on |M |. By induction on n we choose a sequence
〈(Mn,γ , β¯n,γ , b¯n,γ) : γ < (2µ)+〉 such that
⊞1 (a) β¯n,γ = 〈βn,γ,ℓ : ℓ < n〉 is a decreasing sequence of ordinals from PM ,
which are > γ and b¯n,γ = 〈bn,γ,ℓ : ℓ < n〉 is a sequence
of members of M
(b) Mn,γ ≺L
∂+,θ+
M, ‖Mn,γ‖ = µ and bn,γ,ℓ, βn,γ,ℓ ∈Mn,γ for ℓ < n
(recall µ = 2∂)
(c) for γ1 < γ2 < (2
µ)+ we have (Mn,γ1 , b¯n,γ1 , β¯n,γ1)
∼= (Mn,γ2 , b¯n,γ2 , β¯n,γ2),
note that the isomorphism is unique as <M is a well ordering and
necessarily the isomorphism maps bn,γ1,ℓ to bn,γ2,ℓ
and βn,γ1,ℓ to βn,γ2,ℓ for ℓ < n
(d) if n = m+ 1 then
(i) β¯n,γ↾m = β¯m,ζ when ζ = βn,γ,m
(ii) Mm,βn,γ,m ≺L∂+,θ+ Mn,γ
(iii) a ∈Mm,βn,γ,m ⇒M |= aRbn,γ
(iv) if b ∈Mm,βn,γ,m then {a :M |= aRb} ⊆ {a :M |= aRbn,γ}.
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For n = 0 just choose M0,γ = M0 ≺L
∂+,θ+
M, ‖M0‖ = µ, (OK as µ∂ = µ, in fact
an overkill).
For n = m+ 1, choose M ′m,γ, b
′
m,γ such that:
⊞2 (i) if a ∈Mm,γ then aRMb′m,γ
(ii) moreover if b ∈Mm,γ then {a ∈M :M |= aRb} ⊆
{a ∈M :M |= aRb′m,γ}
(iii) Mm,γ ∪ {b′m,γ} ∪ {γ} ⊆M
′
m,γ
(iv) M ′m,γ ≺L∂+,θ+ M .
The number of (M ′m,γ ,Mm,γ , β¯m,γ+1, b¯n,γ+1, γ, b
′
m,γ)/
∼= is ≤ 2µ so for some un-
bounded Yn ⊆ (2
µ)+, the models 〈(M ′m,γ ,Mm,γ+1, β¯m,γ+1, b¯n,γ+1, γ, b
′
m,γ) : γ ∈ Yn〉
are pairwise isomorphic.
For any ζ < (2µ)+ let γζ = Min(Y \(ζ+1)),Mn,ζ =M ′m,γζ , b¯ζ,n = b¯m,γζˆ〈b
′
m,γζ
〉, β¯n,ζ =
β¯m,γζˆ〈γζ〉. Clearly 〈(Mn,ζ , b¯n,ζ, β¯n,ζ) : ζ < (2
µ)+〉 is as required.
Having carried the induction, it is easy to find models Nn and elements aℓ, bℓ for
ℓ < n by induction on n < ω such that:
⊞3 (a) (Nn, a0, . . . , an−1, b0, . . . , bn−1) is isomorphic to (Mγ,n, β¯γ,n, b¯γ,n)
for every γ < (2µ)+
(b) Nm ≺L
∂+,θ+
Nn if m < n.
Now easily by 2.11 the model N =
⋃
n
Nn and the sequence b¯ = 〈bn : n < ω〉 are as
required in clause (B) with 〈an : n < ω〉 witnessing clause (β) of clause (B). 3.1
Conclusion 3.2. For κ = iκ, the logic L
1
κ satisfies:
SUDWO1κ (strong undefinability of well ordering) which means:
if ψ ∈ L1κ(τ), |τ | < κ and <,R are two place predicates from τ then for every
large enough µ1 < κ for arbitrarily large enough µ2 < κ we have:
⊛ if λ > µ2 and A is a τ -expansion of (H (λ),∈, µ1, µ2, <) with < the order
on the ordinals and RA being ∈, that is ∈ ↾H (λ) then we can findB, an, dn
(for n < ω) such that
(a) B |= ψ ⇔M |= ψ
(b) B |= “dn+1 < dn < µ2” for n < ω
(c) B |= “an ⊆ an+1 has cardinality ≤ µ1”
(d) if e ∈ B then B |= “e ∈ an” for some n
we may add
(d)+ if e ∈ B and B |= “|e| ≤ µ1” then B |= “e ⊆ an” for some n.
Remark 3.3. There are other variants. At the moment the distinction is not crucial.
Proof. By 3.1. 3.6
Theorem 3.4. First Characterization Theorem
We have L ≤ L1κ, i.e. every ψ ∈ L is equivalent to some ψ
′ ∈ L1κ (i.e. for any
vocabulary τ, . . .) when :
⊞ (a) κ = iκ hence is a strong limit uncountable cardinal
(b) L is a nice logic
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(c) Υ, the occurance number of L , is ≤ κ
(d) L−1κ ≤ L , i.e. Lθ+,ℵ0 ≤ L for θ < κ or just
(d)− for every ordinal α < κ, the model Mα expanding (α,<) is
characterized up to isomorphism by some sentence from L1κ(τ(Mα)),
so |τ(Mα)| < κ
(e) L satisfies SUDWO1κ.
Remark 3.5. 1) We could add the downward LST and restrict somewhat SUDWOκ.
2) As L1κ satisfies the demands (by 2.15) we can rephrase Theorem 3.4 as: L is
≤-maximal such that (a)-(e) holds.
Proof. Assume toward contradiction that ψ∗ ∈ L (τ) is a sentence which is not
equivalent to any sentence of L1κ(τ). As the occurance number of L is ≤ κ by clause
(c) of the assumption, without loss of generality the vocabulary τ has cardinality
< Υ ≤ κ. Similarly by L being a logic, using clauses (c),(d) of Definition 1.9,
without loss of generality the symbols we add to τ in (∗)3(a) below do not belong
to τ . We shall derive another sentence ψ∗∗ in a somewhat bigger vocabulary, and
let (µ1, µ2) be as in Definition 3.6 for ψ
∗∗ and µ1 ≥ θ∗.
Let
(∗)0 (a) {Pi : i < i(∗)} list the predicates in τ
(b) {Hj : j < j(∗)} list the function symbols in τ
(c) let the vocabulary τ1 be
• the set of predicates {P ′i : i ≤ i(∗)}
• the set of function symbols {H ′j : j < j(∗)}
• arityτ1(P
′
i(∗)) = 2
• arityτ1(P
′
i ) = arityτ (Pi) + 1 for i < i(∗)
• arityτ1(H
′
j) = arityτ (Hj) + 1 for j < j(∗)
(d) for a τ1-structure B and c ∈ B let N
B
c be the τ -model (if exists)
such that
• it has universe {d : B |= P ′i(∗)(d, d)}
• (Pi)N
B
c = {a¯ : 〈c〉ˆa¯ ∈ (P ′i )
B} for i < i(∗), j < j(∗)
• H
NBc
j (a¯) = (H
′
j)
B(〈c〉ˆa¯) for i < i(∗).
For each α < κ, let θ(α) = θα = |α| + ℵ0, so the equivalence relation E 1qf(τ),θ(α),α
is well defined, and has < iθ(α)+ equivalence classes say 〈Nα,ε/E
1
qf(τ),θ(α),α : ε <
εα < iθ(α)+(|τ |)〉.
By the definition of L1≤θ(τ) which is ≤ L
1
κ(τ), for each such pair (α, ε) there is
a sentence ϑα,ε ∈ L
1
≤θ(α)(τ) which define Nα,ε/E
1
qf(τ),θ(α),α and moreover for every
u ⊆ εα the sentence ϑα,u = ∨{ϑα,ε : ε ∈ u} belongs to L1κ(τ), i.e. up to equivalence.
Hence by our assumption toward contradiction for some ζ(α) < εα there are
(∗)1 (a) Mα, Nα ∈ Nα,ζ(α)/E
1
qf(τ),θ(α),α
(b) Nα |= ψ∗ but Mα |= ¬ψ∗.
By the definition of E 1qf(τ),θ(α),θ there is a sequence M¯α such that
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(∗)2 (a) M¯α = 〈Mα,k : k ≤ k(α)〉 so k(α) < ω
(b) Mα,0 =M,Mα,k(α) = Nα
(c) Mα,k,Mα,k+1 are E
0
qf(τ),θ(α),α-equivalent for k < k(α)
(d) let Mα,k ∼=Mα,k(α) for k ∈ (k(α), ω).
Without loss of generality the universes of the models Mα,k(α < κ, k < ω) are
pairwise disjoint and τ ⊆ H<ℵ0(|τ |). For large enough λ we have 〈〈Mα,k : k ≤
k(α)〉 : α < κ〉 ∈ H (λ) for every α < κ and so λ > κ; let Aλ = A(λ) be a model
such that:
(∗)4 (a) the vocabulary τ2 of Aλ is τ1 ∪ {<,E,R,R1, F1, F2} ∪ {cα : α ≤ θ+∗ },
with cα individual constants, F1, F2 unary function symbols,
<,E binary predicates
(b) universe H (λ)
(c) among the elements c
A(λ)
α , (α < θ∗) will be κ, θ∗, θ
+
∗ , µ1, µ2, τ, τ1 and
every symbol in τ and α ≤ θ∗ ⇒ cθ∗+α(A) = α; so
c
A(λ)
0 = κ, c
A(λ)
1 = θ∗, etc.
(d) the functions ωα+ k 7→Mα,k and α 7→ k(α) are F
A(λ)
1 , F
A(λ)
2
respectively
(e) <A(λ) is the order on the ordinals
(f) EA(λ) is an equivalence relation such that
the equivalence classes of EA are {|Mα,k| : α < κ and k < ω}
(g)(α) RA(λ) = {(a, b) : a ∈ b ∈ H (λ) and |b| ≤ µ1}
(β) R
A(λ)
1 = θ↾H (λ)
(h) (P ′i(∗))
A(λ) = {(a, ωα+ k) : k < ω, α < κ and a ∈Mα,k}
(i) (P ′i )
A(λ) = {a¯ˆ〈ωα+ k〉 : α < κ, a¯ ∈ P
Mα,k
i and k < ω} for i < i(∗)
(j) H
A(λ)
j is an (arityτ (Hj) + 1)-place function satisfying
HAj (a¯ˆ〈ωα+ k〉) = H
Mα,k
j (a¯) for j < j(∗), α < κ and k < ω.
Let ψ∗∗ says:
(∗)5 (a) one first order sentence saying all relevant (set-theoretic) properties
(b) description of τ, τ1
(c) (∀α < κ)(Mα,0 |= ψ∗ and Mα,k(α) |= ¬ψ
∗).
Why possible? For clauses (a),(b) as L−1Υ ≤ L , by clause (d) of the assumption or
just ensuring {a : a < c1} isomorphic to θ+∗ if we just assume clause (d)
− of the
assumption and then the rest is said by a first order sentence. For clause (c) as the
logic has restriction and weak substitution (see clauses (c),(d) of Definition 1.12)
recalling the logic is closed under the first order operations.
Now apply SUDWO1κ to ψ
∗∗, (Aλ, µ1, µ2), and we get B, an, dn(n < ω) as there.
Now
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(∗)6 without loss of generality τ, τ1 are interpreted in B as τ, τ1 respectively;
similarly the individual constant cα for α < θ
+
∗ is interpreted as c
A(λ)
α , hence
if B |= “c is an ordinal < κ and k(c) = F2(c)” then for k < k(c),m ≤ k(c)
we have:
(a) MBc,m defined naturally as N
B
FB1 (c,m)
is a τ -model (i.e. no non-standard
predicates!)
(b) MBc,0 |= ψ and M
B
c,k(c) |= “¬ψ”
(c) B |= “in the game aqf(τ),θ∗,c[M
B
c,k,M
B
c,k+1] the ISO player wins”
(∗)7 let k(∗) = FB2 (d0)
(∗)8 we fix a winning strategy stk for ISO inB’s sense in the game aqf(τ),θ∗,d[N
B
d0,k
, NBd0,k+1].
Now for each k < k(∗) by induction on n < ω we choose sn,k ∈ B such that:
(∗)9 (a) B |= “s¯n,k = 〈s0,k, . . . , sn,k〉 is an initial segment of a play of the game
aqf(τ),θ∗,d0 [M
B
d0,k
,MBd0,k+1]”
(b) B |= “in this initial segment sn,k the ISO player uses his
winning strategy stk”
(c) the AIS player chooses:
(α) if n is even then ιn = 1 and A
′
n = {e ∈ B : e ∈M
B
d0,k
that is B |= “P ′i(∗)(e, F1(d0, k))” and B |= “eRan”
(β) if n is odd then ιn = 2 and A
′
n = {e ∈ B : e ∈M
B
d0,k+1
and
B |= “eRan”}
(γ) the “ordinal” βsn,k = dn+1.
This can be done and gk = {(a1, a2): for some n we have B |= “g
sn,k
n (a1) = a2”},
it is an isomorphism from MBd0,k onto M
B
d0,k+1
. As this holds for every k < k(∗) we
get that MBd0,0,M
B
d0,k(∗)
are isomorphic so by (∗)6(b) we get a contradiction. 3.4
Definition 3.6. Let Θθ,R be the sentence (for R a binary predicate) such that
M = (|M |, RM ) |= Θθ,R iff P = {{a : aRMb} : b ∈ M} is a (θ,ℵ0)-cover of
Dom(PM ) which means: it is a family of subsets of Dom(R) = {a : aRMb for some
b ∈M} each of cardinalilty ≤ θ such that any u ∈ [Dom(RM )]≤θ is included in the
union of countably many such sets.
Claim 3.7. 1) Θθ,R can be expressed by a sentence in L
1
≤θ+({R}).
2) In fact, if M1,M2 are E
1
qf({R}),θ+,ω+ω+1-equivalent {R}-models then M1 |=
Θθ,R ⇔M2 |= Θθ,R.
3) If M1E
1
qf(τ),θ,αM2 and α ≥ ω + ω + 1 and cf(θ) ≥ ℵ0 then ‖M1‖ = ‖M1‖ or
‖M1‖, ‖M2‖ > θ.
4) If M1E
1
qf(τ),θ,αM2 and ‖M1‖ ≤ θ and α ≥ ω + ω + 1 then M1
∼=M2.
Proof. 1) By (2).
2) Toward contradiction, assume this fails; and without loss of generality M1E
0
qf({R}),θ+,ω+ω+1M2.
By symmetry, without loss of generality assume M2 |= Θθ,R but M1 |= ¬Θθ,R. We
simulate a play of the game aqf({R}),θ+,ω+ω+1(M1,M2) in which the ISO player
uses a (fixed) winning strategy st.
NICE INFINITARY LOGICS 27
Case 1: There is B∗ ∈ [M1]≤θ not included in a countable union of sets from
{{a : aRM1b} : b ∈ M1}. Here aqf({R}),θ,ω+ω+1[M1,M2] suffice; we now simulate a
play in which the ISO player uses st.
In the first move we let the AIS player choose βs1 = ω + ω and choose ιs1 =
1, A1s1 = B∗ ∈ [M1]
≤θ, see above. Let the ISO player (using st) complete the choice
of the state s1 (which is a winning state for itself, of course).
Let n(∗) be minimal such that:
(∗) B := {a ∈ A1s1 : h
1
s1
(a) < n(∗)− 7} is not included in a countable union of
sets from {{a : aRM1b} : b ∈ B}.
By the case assumption, n(∗) is well defined. In the following n(∗)−2 moves, the AIS
player takes care that βs2 = ω+n(∗), . . . , βsn(∗) = ω+1 (and ιs2 = . . . = ιsn(∗) = 1).
So gsn(∗) is a function whose domain includes {a ∈ A
1
s1
: h1s1(a) < n(∗)} hence
includes B. Now as M2 |= Θθ,R we can find cn ∈ M2 for n < ω such that (∀b ∈
B)
∨
n
gsn(∗)(b)R
M2cn and AIS player takes care that βsn(∗)+1 = ω and {cn : n <
ω} ⊆ A2sn(∗)+1 .
The rest should be clear.
Case 2: There is b∗ ∈M1 such that B∗ = {a ∈M1 : aRM1b∗} has cardinality > θ.
Here aqf({R}),θ+,ω+1 suffice, and let B ⊆ B∗ be of cardinality θ
+. We simulate a
play in which the AIS player takes care that βs1 = ω, ιs1 = 1, A
1
s1
= {b∗} ∪B.
We let n∗ be minimal such that h
1
s1
(b∗) < n∗−7 and |{b ∈ B : h1s1(b) < n∗−7}| ≥
θ+.
The rest should be clear.
3) Should be clear. 3.7
Recall
Definition 3.8. 1) A logic L is ∆-closed when : for vocabularies τ1 ⊆ τ2 with
τ2\τ1 finite, and sentences ψ, ϑ ∈ L (τ2) if K0 = {M↾τ1 : M |= ψ},K1 = {M↾τ1 :
M |= ϑ} are complementary classes of τ1-models then some ϕ ∈ L (τ1) define K1.
2) A logic L is strongly ∆-closed when : for relational vocabularies τ1 ⊆ τ2 with
τ2\τ1 finite, unary predicate P ∈ τ2\τ1 and sentences ψ, ϑ ∈ L (τ2), if K0 :=
{(M↾τ1)↾PM : M |= ψ and PM 6= ∅} and K1 := {(M↾τ1)↾PM : M |= ϑ and
PM 6= ∅} are complementary classes of τ1-models then some ϕ ∈ L (τ1) define K1.
3) A logic L has dullness-elimination when : if τ1, τ2 are relational vocabularies,
i.e. with predicates only, τ2 = τ1 ∪ {P}, P a unary predicate, ψ2 ∈ L (τ2) and for
every M |= ψ2 we have Q ∈ τ1 ⇒ QM = QM↾PM and PM 6= ∅ then for some
ψ1 ∈ L (τ1) we have {M : M a τ1-model of ψ1} = {(M↾τ1)↾PM : M a τ2-model of
ψ2}.
4) We say the logic L is ∆-closed in C for C a class of cardinals when : if in part
(1) we assume just that K0 ∩KτC,K0 ∩K
τ
C are complimentary in K
τ
C = {M :M a
τ -model of cardinality from C} then for some ψ ∈ L (τ1) for every τ1-model M of
cardinality ∈ C we have M |= ψ ⇔M ∈ K0.
Claim 3.9. 1) The logic L1≤θ has dullness-elimination.
2) If τ is empty, M1,M2 are τ-models of cardinality > θ then M1,M2 are E
1
qf(τ),θ,α-
equivalent for α < θ+.
3) Also ‖M1‖, ‖M2‖ ≥ θ, cf(θ) = ℵ0 is O.K. in part (2).
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Proof. 1) Easy (or use the sum theorem (see 3.16) and part (2)).
2),3) Easy. 3.9
Theorem 3.10. Second Characterization Theorem
Let κ = iκ, then L
1
κ is the minimal logic L (up to equivalence) such that:
⊕ (a) L is a nice logic
(b) L −1κ ≤ L , i.e. Lθ+,ℵ0 ≤ L for θ < κ
(c) Θθ,R is equivalent to some sentence in L
(d) L is ∆-closed
(e) L has dullness-elimination.
Remark 3.11. Putting together 3.4, 3.10 we get full characterization.
Proof. First L1κ satisfies clause (a) by 2.15(2), clause (b) by 2.15, clause (c) by 3.7(1)
and clause (d) by Theorem 3.13 and Observation 3.12(1) below, and lastly L1κ has
dullness-elimination by Claim 3.9(1) so together L1κ satisfies ⊕ of 3.10. Second, we
shall assume L satisfies ⊕ and ψ ∈ L1κ(τ) and we shall find ψ
′ ∈ L (τ) equivalent
to it (it will be ϕ1 below). By “L satisfies weak substitution” without loss of
generality τ has predicates only.
We deal with and define naturally ψ[P ] ∈ L1κ(τ), P a new unary predicate and
let τ ′ = τ ∪ {P} so ψ[P ] says (M↾τ)↾PM satisfies ψ.
Let θ, α < κ and let ψ ∈ L1κ(τ) be defined using (qf(τ), θ, α), so |τ | < κ. We let
∂ = iα+1(θ + |τ |) and µ = 2
∂. Let τ+ = τ ′ ∪ {R1, R}, arity(R1) = 3, arity(R) = 2
and R,R1 /∈ τ ′. For i = 0, 1 let Kℓ be the class of τ+-models M such that:
⊞ℓ (a) (|M |, RM ) |= Θµ,R and PM 6= ∅
(b) {Bb : b ∈M} is ⊆-directed where Bb = {a ∈M : aR
M b}
(c) for each b ∈M the set {(a1, a2) : (a1, a2, b) ∈ RM1 } is a well ordering
of Bb of order type ≤ µ
(d) if b1, b2 ∈M and Bb1 ⊆ Bb2 ⊆ P
M then
(M↾τ)↾Bb1 ≺L∂+,∂+ (M↾τ)↾Bb2 in particular Bb1 is
closed under FM for any function symbol
F ∈ τ
(e) if b ∈M , then for some c we have Bc = Bb ∩ P
M ⊆ Bc ⊆ P
M
(f) if b ∈M and Bb ⊆ P then (M↾τ)↾Bb |= ψ
[P ] iff ℓ = 1
(g) if Q ∈ τ then QM = QM↾PM .
Now
(∗)1 clauses (b),(c),(d),(e),(g) of ⊞ℓ can be described by some ϕ ∈ L(2µ)+,ℵ0(τ1).
[Why? Note clause (c), so obvious.]
(∗)2 clause (f) can be expressed by a sentence from L (τ+).
[Why? Let 〈Nα : α < 2µ〉 list the τ -models with universe ⊆ µ. For each b ∈ M
such that Bb ⊆ PM let gb be the unique one-to-one function from Bb onto some
ordinal γb ≤ µ such that
• if a1, a2 ∈ Bb then (a1, a2, b) ∈ R
M
1 ⇔ gb(a) < gb(a2).
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Hence for such b there is a unique αb such that gb is an isomorphism from (M↾τ)↾Bb
onto Nα. For each α there is a formula ψα(x) ∈ Lµ+,ℵ0(τM ) such that for every
b ∈M we have M |= ψα[b] iff b is as above and αb = α.
So for every u ⊆ 2µ, ψ′u(x) =
∨
α∈u
ψα(x) belongs to L(2µ)+,ℵ0(τM ) hence is equiv-
alent to some ψ′′u(x) ∈ L (τM ). Now (∗)2 should be clear.]
(∗)3 Kℓ is definable by some ϕℓ ∈ L (τ+) for ℓ = 1, 2.
[Why? By clause (b) of the assumption, some ϕ′ ∈ L (τ+) is equivalent to ϕ where
ϕ∗ is from (∗)1. By clause (c) of the assumption some ϕ′′ ∈ L (τ+) is equivalent
to Θθ,R. But by clause (a) of the assumption L is a nice logic, hence (see clauses
(b)2, (b)3, (c) of Definition 1.12) there is a sentence ϕ
′
ℓ ∈ L (τ
+) equivalent to ϕℓ
from (∗)3. By clause (b)2 of Definition 1.12, there is ϕℓ ∈ L (τ+) equivalent to
ϕ′ ∧ ϕ′ℓ so we are done.]
(∗)4 for ℓ = 1, 2 the classes {(M1↾τ)↾PM1 : M1 ∈ K1}, {(M2↾τ)PMi ,M2 ∈ K2}
are equal to {M : M a τ -model of ψ}, {M : M a τ -model of ¬ψ}, respec-
tively.
By L being ∆-closed and having dullness-elimination (see clauses (d),(e) of the
theorem’s assumption) we are done. 3.10
We can note and recall
Observation 3.12. 1) If the logic L satisfies interpolation then it is ∆-closed.
2) L is ∆-closed and has dullness-elimination iff L is strongly ∆-closed.
3) If L satisfies interpolation with finitely many sorts (so the interpolant mentions
only the common sorts) then L is strongly ∆-closed.
4) The logic L satisfies interpolation and dullness-elimination iff L satisfies in-
terpolation for finitely many sort models.
5) In 3.10 we can replace clauses (d),(e) by
(d)′ for every µ < κ,L is ∆-closed in {λ : λ = λµ}, see Definition 3.8.
Proof. Should be clear. 3.12
Theorem 3.13. 1) For κ = iκ the logic L
1
κ satisfies interpolation.
2) Also if ψ ∈ L1≤θ(τ1) where θ < κ, the vocabularies τ0 ⊆ τ1 have cardinality ≤ θ
and ∂ = iθ+ , µ = 2
∂ then we can find a sequence 〈ψα : α < (2∂)+〉 of members of
L1≤2∂ (τ0) such that:
(a) ⊢ ψ → ψα for α < (2
µ)+
(b) if τ0 = τ1∩τ2 and ϑ ∈ L1≤θ(τ2) a sentence such that ⊢ ψ → ϑ then ⊢ ψα → ϑ
for some α < (2µ)+.
Proof. 1) This means that we should prove the existence of ψ ∈ L1κ(τ0) such that
⊢ ψ1 → ψ and ⊢ ψ → ψ2 when we assume:
⊞1 (a) τ1 ∩ τ2 = τ0
(b) ψℓ ∈ L1κ(τℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2
(c) ⊢ ψ1 → ψ2.
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Toward contradiction we assume this fails. Without loss of generality τℓ(ℓ < 3) are
vocabularies of cardinality < κ.
Let θ∗ be such that θ∗ < κ, θ∗ ≥ |τ1| + |τ2| and ψℓ ∈ L1≤θ∗ for ℓ = 1, 2. For
each θ ∈ [θ∗, κ) as L
1
≤θ(τ0) is closed under conjunction (and conjunctions) of ≤ θ
formulas and negations, clearly
⊞2 for every α < κ we can choose M
1
α,M
2
α such that
(a) M1α is a τ1-model
(b) M2α is a τ2-model
(c) M1α↾τ0,M
2
θ ↾τ0 are E
1
qf(τ0),|α|,α
-equivalent
(d) M1α |= ψ1
(e) M2α |= ¬ψ2
and continue naturally as in the proof of 3.4.
2) Similarly. 3.13
Theorem 3.14. If κ = iκ then L
1
κ satisfies the addition and product theorems,
that is (all the models are τ-models for a fixed vocabulary τ ; for the sum case we
assume τ has no function symbols (in particular no individual constants; or only
unary functions) and the relevant models have disjoint universes):
(a) sum: ThL1κ(M1 +M2) = ThL1κ(M1) + ThL1κ(M2) that is,
(a)′ if ThL1κ(Mℓ) = ThL1κ(Nℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2 then ThL1κ(M1 +M2) = ThL1κ(N1 +
N2)
(b) product - ThL1κ(M1 ×M2) = ThL1κ(M1)× ThL1κ(M2) that is,
(b)′ if ThL1κ(Mℓ) = ThL1κ(Nℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2 then ThL1κ(M1 ×M2) = ThL1κ(N1 ×
N2)
(c) moreover, we can replace ThL1κ(N) by N/E
1
qf(τ),θ,α when θ < κ, α < θ
+.
Proof. It suffices to prove clause (c). We prove it for products. For the sums this
is easier.
Clause (c) for product:
Clearly it suffices to prove
⊞ assume Mι = M
ι
1 ×M
ι
2 for ι = 1, 2 are τ -models and M
1
ℓ E
1
qf(τ),θ,αM
2
ℓ for
ℓ = 1, 2 then M1E
1
qf(τ),θ,αM2.
So let 〈Mℓ,k : k ≤ k(ℓ, ι)〉 be such thatM1,0 =M1ℓ ,M2,k =M
2
ℓ andMℓ,kE
0
qf(τ),θ,αMℓ,k+1
for k < k(ℓ). Let k(∗) = max{k(1), k(2)} and letMℓ,k =Mℓ,k(ℓ) if k(ℓ) < k ≤ k(∗).
As E 0qf(τ),θ,α is reflexive, still we have Mℓ,kE
0
qf(τ),αMℓ,k+1 for ℓ = 1, 2 and k < k(∗).
Let Mk = M1,k ×M2,k for k ≤ k(∗) we have to prove M0E 1qf(τ),θ,αMk(∗); by the
definition of E 1qf(τ),θ,α it suffices to prove for each k < k(∗) that
⊕k MkE 0qf(τ),θ,αMk+1.
So we have to find a winning strategy for the ISO player for the game aqf(τ),θ,α[Mk,Mk+1].
The ISO player restricts itself, in the n-th move to (θ, n)-states sn for a play of
aqf(τ),θ,α[Mk,Mk+1] satisfying, for some pair (sn,1, sn,2), that for ℓ = 1, 2
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(a) sn,ℓ is a winning n-state for the game aqf(τ),θ,α[Mℓ,k,Mℓ,k+1]
(b) Aℓsn = A
ℓ
sn,1
×Aℓsn,2
(c) hsn((b, c)) = max{h
1
sn,1
(b), h2sn,ℓ(c)}.
The rest should be clear. 3.14
∗ ∗ ∗
Remark 3.15. 1) Theorem 3.14 applies to the monadic version, too.
2) Why κ = iκ? As for any θ and α < θ
+ there is a sentence ψ ∈ Lθ+ and model
Mψ of ψ of cardinality iα such that any other model N of ψ can be embedded into
Mψ.
3) For infinite addition, i.e.
∑
s∈I
M ℓs , we have a problem: passing to E
0
qf(τ),θ,α we do
not know how to uniformize k(s), of course: if k(s) is constant or bounded there,
then a parallel claim holds, still see 3.16 below.
4) Even overcoming this obstacle, for infinite product we have a problem during a
play of aqf(τ),θ,α[M,N ]. The point is about translating the h’s from here to there
and back. There may well be a difference between product (or reduced product)
and generalized product. Anyhow unlike part (2) this cannot be remedied using
E
0
qf(τ),θ,α we know that, see 4.10.
Theorem 3.16. 1) Assume, for simplicity that τ is a relational vocabulary and
〈M ℓs : s ∈ I〉 is a sequence of τ-models with pairwise disjoint universes, for ℓ = 1, 2
and M1 = Σ{M1s : s ∈ S},M2 = Σ{M
2
s : s ∈ S}. If κ = iκ and M
1
s ,M
2
s are
L1κ-equivalent for s ∈ S then M1,M2 are L
1
κ-equivalent.
2) Moreover for every θ, α < κ there are ∂, β < κ such that for any set S and
sequence 〈M ℓs : s ∈ S〉 for ℓ ∈ {1, 2} of pairwise disjoint τ-models we have: if
M1s ,M
2
s are Eqf(τ),∂,β-equivalent for s ∈ S then the models M1 = Σ{M
1
s : s ∈
S},M2 = Σ{M2s : s ∈ S} are Eqf(τ),θ,α-equivalent.
3) In part (2) if M bsE
0
qf(τ),θ,αM
2
j for every s ∈ S then M1E
0
qf(τ),θ,αM2.
Proof. 1),2) By the proof of 3.4.
3) As in the proof of 3.14. 3.16
Remark 3.17. This proof indicates that there are better versions of the game for
which we can choose (∂, β) = (θ, α). However, it is not clear whether a more
complicated definition is worth the gain.
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§ 4. L1κ is strong
Our first aim is:
Question 4.1. How strong is L1κ? It is more like L
−1
κ or L
0
κ? E.g. upward LST?
Downward LST to which cardinals?
So far we have given indication to its being similar to L−1κ , however we shall
show below that for the LST, L1κ is closer to L
0
κ (see 4.8) and fail the theorem on
the theory of an infinite product (which both L0κ,L
−1
κ satisfies). But restricting
ourselves to cardinals λ = λℵ0 ≥ κ, the situation for the downward LST is similar
to the one for L0κ, see below.
Definition 4.2. For a relational vocabulary τ and cardinal θ of cofinality > ℵ0 we
say K is a (τ, θ, ω)-class of structures when :
(a) K is a class of τ -models each of cardinality θ
(b) K is closed under submodels of cardinality θ
(c) K is closed under isomorphism
(d) K is closed under increasing union of ω-chains.
2) For τ, θ,K as above let ψK ∈ L0(2θ)+,θ+(τ) be a sentence such that for τ -models
M we have: M |= ψK iff for any A ⊆ M of cardinality θ there is h : A → ω such
that for every large enough n,M↾h−1{n} ∈ K.
Example 4.3. LetKwoθ = {(A,<∗) :<∗ is a linear order of A and for some sequence
〈Un : n < ω〉 we have (Un, <∗ ↾Un) ∼= (θ,<) and Un ⊆ Un+1 and A = ∪{Un : n <
ω}.
Claim 4.4. For τ,K as in 4.2.
1) The sentence ψK belongs to L(2θ)+,θ+(τ) indeed.
2) If θ + |K/ ∼= | = µ then moreover ψK ∈ L0µ+,θ+.
3) Moreover ψK ∈ L
1
≤θ.
Proof. 1),2) Obvious.
3) Easy. 4.4
Claim 4.5. 1) If λ ≥ 2θ then Θθ,R has a model of cardinality λ iff cov(λ, θ+, θ+,ℵ0) =
λ, see Remark 4.7 below (or [Sh:g, II]).
2) If λ = λℵ0 ≥ 2ℵ0 then Θθ,R has a model of cardinality λ iff λ = λθ.
Proof. 1) Read the definitions.
2) Check. 4.5
Complementary is
Claim 4.6. Assume (κ = iκ and) λ = cov(λ, κ, κ,ℵ1) and τ is a vocabulary of
cardinality < λ. For every τ-model M of cardinality > λ there is N ⊆ M of
cardinality λ such that N ≡L1κ M .
2) Assume λ = cov(λ,iγ ,iγ ,ℵ1) for every γ < θ+. If M is a τ-model, |τ | ≤ iθ+
and ‖M‖ > λ then there is N ⊆M of cardinality λ such that N ≡L1
≤θ
M .
Proof. Similar to 2.15(4)(c), but in ω stages deal simultaneously with λ submodels
in each stage. 4.6
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Remark 4.7. Recall cov(λ, µ, θ, σ) = Min{|P| : P ⊆ [λ]<µ and for every u ∈ [λ]<θ
there are α < σ and ui ∈ P for i < α such that u ⊆ ∪{ui : i < α}} for λ ≥ µ ≥
θ ≥ σ.
Concerning the upward LST theorem, the logic L1κ fail it badly.
Claim 4.8. There is a sentence ψ from L1≤ℵ1 such that: ψ has a model of cardinality
λ iff λ9 (ℵ1)
<ω
2 .
Proof. Easy, recalling 4.4(3). 4.8
Discussion 4.9. We can phrase other relatives. Also it points to the restrictions
when we are looking for such logics with upward LST.
Theorem 4.10. 1) For every θ there are models 〈Mn, Nn : n < ω〉 with a fixed
countable vocabulary such thatMn, Nn are L
1
≤θ-equivalent for n < ω but
∏
n<ω
Mn,
∏
n<ω
Nn
are not L1
≤2ℵ0
-equivalent.
2) Moreover in aqf(τ),2ℵ0 ,ω+1[
∏
n<ω
Mn,
∏
n<ω
Nn] the AIS player has a winning strat-
egy.
Proof. Let τ = {c,<}∪{Fn : n < ω} where Fn is a unary function, c is an individual
constant and < is a binary relation.
For every α let Mnα be the τ -model with universe 1+α, c
Mnα = 0, <M
n
α= {(i, j) :
i = 0 = j or i < j < 1 + α} and F
Mnα
k is the identity when k = n and is constantly
0 otherwise.
Fix θ ≥ 2ℵ0 , by 3.1 for some α = α(θ) large enough for each n there is a model
Nn which is L
1
≤θ-equivalent to M
n
α , but <
Nn ↾(|Nn|\{cNn}) is not well ordered; let
Mn = M
n
α and 〈dn,k : k < ω〉 be a <
Nn-decreasing sequence of members of Nn
which are 6= cNn .
Let M =
∏
n<ω
Mn and N =
∏
n<ω
Nn. For η ∈ ωω let dη = 〈dn,η(n) : n < ω〉 ∈
∏
n<ω
Nn = N .
Now
⊛ if Λ ⊆ ωω is non-meagre or just not bounded in (ωω,<Jbdω ) then there is
no partial isomorphism f from N into M with domain {dη : η ∈ Λ}, i.e. f
should preserve all quantifier-free formulas.
This clearly suffices as if Λ = ∪{Λn : n < ω} then at least for one n, the set Λ is
non-meagre (or just unbounded in (ωω,<Jbdω )).
Why is ⊛ true? Toward contradiction assume that f is such a partial isomor-
phism. By the assumption for some n(∗) < ω the set {η(n(∗)) : η ∈ Λ} is infinite,
so choose η¯ = 〈ηk : k < ω〉 such that
(∗)0 〈ηk(n(∗)) : k < ω〉 is strictly increasing in Nn(∗).
Now:
(∗)1 ifm(1) < m(2) < ω then for every n < ω we haveNn |= “Fn(∗)(dn,ηm(2)(n(∗))) <
Fn(∗)(dn,ηm(1)(n(∗)))”.
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[Why? If n = n(∗) then FNn
n(∗) is the identity and this means Nn |= “dn,m(2) <
dn,m(1)” which holds by the choice of 〈dn,k : k < ω〉 recalling (∗)0. If n < ω ∧ n 6=
n(∗) then FNn
n(∗) is constantly 0 so this means Nn |= “0 < 0” which holds by the
choice of Nn (and <
Mnα ), so we are done.]
(∗)2 N |= “Fn(∗)(dηm(2)) < Fn(∗)(dηm(1))” for m(1) < m(2) < ω.
[Why? By (∗)1 and the definition of product.]
Also
(∗)3 if m < ω then Nn(∗) |= “c 6= Fn(∗)(dn(∗),ηm(n(∗)))” hence N |= “c 6=
Fn(∗)(dηn)”
(∗)4 let νk = f(dηk) so νk = 〈ak,n : n < ω〉 ∈
∏
n<ω
Mn.
But f is a partial isomorphism so by (∗)2 + (∗)3 + (∗)4 we have
(∗)5 M |= “Fn(∗)(νm(2)) < Fn(∗)(νm(1)) 6= c” for m(1) < m(2) < ω.
Hence for every n,Mn |= “Fn(∗)(νm(2)(n)) < Fn(∗)(νm(1)(n))” for m(1) < m(2) <
ω. Also by the choice of FMn
n(∗) we have n 6= n(∗)⇒Mn |= “c = Fn(∗)(νm(1)(n))” but
M |= “c 6= Fn(∗)(νm(1))” henceMn(∗) |= “c 6= Fn(∗)(νm(1)(n(∗)))”, i.e. νm(1)(n(∗)) 6=
0. Together 〈νm(n(∗)) : m < ω〉 is <Mn -decreasing in Mn(∗)\{0} contradic-
tion. 4.10
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